A Mad Call to Arms | Standpoint

September 2009

The rationalist and centralist nature of decision-making in the US and USSR and the effective neutralisation of nuclear policy from public pressures during the Cold War allowed policymakers to develop rational strategies and ever-stronger constraints against confrontation. It may be argued that the Middle Eastern regimes are no less rational, and therefore will not embark on a course that will lead to their utter destruction. This is the gist of Anthony Cordesman's thesis, delivered at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in November 2007, that given the nuclear balance between Israel and Iran for the short and medium term, a first strike against Israel by Iran would have marginal value and while Israeli recovery would be possible, Iranian recovery after a massive Israeli strike would not be. He argued that it would be suicidal for Iran to embark on the road to nuclear confrontation with Israel.

This argument suffers from two key flaws. First, rationality of the players is no guarantee of a rational outcome. As the late US Secretary of Defence, Robert McNamara, pointed out regarding the Cuban missile crisis: "Kennedy was rational, Khrushchev was rational, Castro was rational, rational individuals came that close to total destruction of their societies." Second, the ability of the US and Soviet leaderships to make decisions on strategic issues with minimal "irrational" input was much greater than that of the regimes in the Middle East. Strategic decision-making was effectively separated from domestic pressures. Leaders in Washington and Moscow did not have to take into account crowds in their respective capitals demonstrating — as they have in Pakistan — with models of nuclear bombs and calling to use them against historic enemies or with apocalyptic or suicidal traditions. The leaders of both countries identified with their constituent populations enough so that they could be deterred by "counter-population" and "counter-value" threats.

In both these aspects, the Middle East differs. The predominance of religion and honour in Middle Eastern culture sets it apart. The history of the region is replete with chronicles of catastrophes foretold. Leaders have brought their nations to — and beyond — the brink of catastrophe with decisions fuelled by domestic pressures, honour, existential hostility (Arab-Iranian/Sunni-Shia/Arab-Jewish) and religion. Religious and nationalistic fervour have led Arab countries to countless military debacles and regimes in the Middle East have shown a predilection for brinkmanship and for perseverance in conflicts despite rational considerations against such behaviour. A case in point is the continuation of the Iraq-Iran war of the 1980s at enormous costs in human lives and material, due to Khomeini's insistence that the elimination of Saddam Hussein was a religious duty and that the war could not end without achieving that goal. Another case in point is the Arab decisions which precipitated the 1967 Israeli-Arab war with the consequences of the loss of Sinai, the West Bank and the Golan. Saddam Hussein continued to brandish weapons he did not have in order not to lose face within the region, even at the price of providing the US and its allies with a casus belli.

There are no grounds to believe that the possession of nuclear weapons will fundamentally change these patterns of behaviour. The level of identification of the regimes and the leaderships with the populations that would bear the brunt of a nuclear exchange also plays a pivotal role in their risk calculus. For many of these leaders, victory or defeat is measured only by their own survival. A sectarian regime is more likely to adopt an après moi le deluge attitude and to engage in nuclear brinkmanship.

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Gilad Lidor

September 2nd, 2009
6:09 PM

An interesting article for which thanks go to the author. However, a number of points need perhaps clarification because this reader is not entirely convinced: 1. Shmuel Bar (SB) posits that: 'The distinction between the Cold War paradigm of bipolar deterrence based on second strike and the multipolar situation in which no nation would have such a capability which will be the case in the Middle East.' Why should the non-existence of a second strike capability, shared equally, be inherently more unstable than the presence of such a capability? Perhaps the perception that you only have 'one shot' would concentrate minds and prevent the execution of a first strike? 2. SB: 'Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that Saudi Arabia would acquire a nuclear weapon from Pakistan (whose nuclear programme it funded) and it is hard to believe that countries like Egypt, Syria and even Iraq could allow themselves to be far behind. Is it so reasonable to assume this? On the basis of conjecture perhaps. And according to reports, Syria has already tried to do so with the assistance of North Korea and was thwarted by Israel. 3. SB: 'A "polynuclear" Middle East will be fundamentally different and less stable. Between Israel and the two key candidates for nuclearisation — Iran and Saudi Arabia — diplomatic relations do not exist. This will make hotlines and the sending of calming signals much more difficult.' The lack of diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia can be resolved using traditional diplomacy. The Saudi peace plan includes within it an element of diplomatic relations, not only with Saudi Arabia but with all those countries that don't have such relations with Israel yet -including SA. Regarding Iran: This is more intractable. However, where is the evidence that bilateral 'diplomatic relations' negate the possibility of signal sending and other techniques of conflict management? 4.SB: ' As the Soviet Union disintegrated, the leadership provided assurances to the United States that the nuclear arsenal remained under control. No nuclear coups d'état have taken place, not to mention use of nuclear weapons in internal conflicts. We cannot be sure that this will be the case in the Middle East, where civil war could result in nuclear weapons falling into the hands of different factions. Coups d'état in the Middle East have rarely resulted in the leaders of the former regime being put out to pasture peacefully. The struggle is one for life and death and it is conceivable that one side may use nuclear weapons as a last-ditch option against its rival' This is pure conjecutre not based on any evidence or analogy - simply because this is a completely unknown situation for which we have no point of reference i.e. the unprecedented nuclear scenario. The point I'm trying to make is that we can't wait for the region to democratise before trying to negotiate Arms Control agreements. However, the danger from Iran is indeed real and perhaps the planners in the west are caluculating that a strike on that country's nuclear facilities will be a replay of what happened in 1945 when Japan was defeated: To smash the warlike hubris of a fanatic leadership leading in turn to concessions. 5. SB: 'Due to the experience in the region of military coups, most regimes will not be willing to relinquish central control and to delegate authority to the military units. In times of calm, this is no problem; in times of tension, it severely restricts the ability of the regime to develop doctrines of graduated response or to maintain escalation dominance' This argument is vague and the paragraph ambiguous and needs teasing out. On the face of it the author is suggesting that lack of military control is less stable than with civilian control. This appears to be contradictory to what has been said before.

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