A Mad Call to Arms | Standpoint

September 2009

Due to the experience in the region of military coups, most regimes will not be willing to relinquish central control and to delegate authority to the military units. In times of calm, this is no problem; in times of tension, it severely restricts the ability of the regime to develop doctrines of graduated response or to maintain escalation dominance.

Research and development organisations in these countries will probably not relinquish control over the weapons. Unlike the case of the Manhattan project, the A.Q. Khan apparatus continued to play a major role in Pakistani nuclear policy, while maintaining its own proliferation network, independent of any "national" decision-making process. This pattern will probably be followed in Iran, where the Revolutionary Guards are already involved in research and development and will probably continue to have operational control over any weapons.

It is doubtful that the countries of the region will integrate into their systems the doctrines of command and control and the wide range of technical safeguards that evolved in the US and the Soviet Union over decades of Cold War.

Since Hiroshima, the world has become accustomed to defining the "use" of nuclear weapons in terms of their most devastating consequences — attacks on large urban civilian populations. The shadow of Hiroshima and the taboo on use of nuclear weapons loomed not only over their strategic against civilian populations but also over a broad gamut of uses of nuclear weapons: the use of small, low-yield tactical weapons against military targets (even when such use may reduce collateral damage); testing of nuclear weapons near the borders of political adversaries; or brandishing nuclear weapons in the context of conventional conflicts.

The countries of the Middle East will probably be more predisposed than the Cold War protagonists to brandish their nuclear weapons, not only rhetorically but through nuclear alerts or nuclear tests, leading to escalation. Once one country has taken such measures, the other nuclear countries of the region would probably feel forced to adopt defensive measures, leading to multilateral escalation. However, such multilateral escalation will not be mitigated by Cold War-type hotlines and means of signalling and none of the parties involved will have escalation dominance. This and the absence of a credible second-strike capability may well strengthen the tendency to opt for a first strike.

True, we may safely assume that the leaders and peoples of the Middle East have no desire to be the targets of nuclear blasts. However, the inherent instability of the region and its regimes, the difficulty in managing multilateral nuclear tensions, the weight of religious, emotional and internal pressures and the proclivity of many of the regimes in the region towards military adventurism and brinkmanship do not bode well for the future of this region once it enters the nuclear age.

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Gilad Lidor

September 2nd, 2009
6:09 PM

An interesting article for which thanks go to the author. However, a number of points need perhaps clarification because this reader is not entirely convinced: 1. Shmuel Bar (SB) posits that: 'The distinction between the Cold War paradigm of bipolar deterrence based on second strike and the multipolar situation in which no nation would have such a capability which will be the case in the Middle East.' Why should the non-existence of a second strike capability, shared equally, be inherently more unstable than the presence of such a capability? Perhaps the perception that you only have 'one shot' would concentrate minds and prevent the execution of a first strike? 2. SB: 'Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that Saudi Arabia would acquire a nuclear weapon from Pakistan (whose nuclear programme it funded) and it is hard to believe that countries like Egypt, Syria and even Iraq could allow themselves to be far behind. Is it so reasonable to assume this? On the basis of conjecture perhaps. And according to reports, Syria has already tried to do so with the assistance of North Korea and was thwarted by Israel. 3. SB: 'A "polynuclear" Middle East will be fundamentally different and less stable. Between Israel and the two key candidates for nuclearisation — Iran and Saudi Arabia — diplomatic relations do not exist. This will make hotlines and the sending of calming signals much more difficult.' The lack of diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia can be resolved using traditional diplomacy. The Saudi peace plan includes within it an element of diplomatic relations, not only with Saudi Arabia but with all those countries that don't have such relations with Israel yet -including SA. Regarding Iran: This is more intractable. However, where is the evidence that bilateral 'diplomatic relations' negate the possibility of signal sending and other techniques of conflict management? 4.SB: ' As the Soviet Union disintegrated, the leadership provided assurances to the United States that the nuclear arsenal remained under control. No nuclear coups d'état have taken place, not to mention use of nuclear weapons in internal conflicts. We cannot be sure that this will be the case in the Middle East, where civil war could result in nuclear weapons falling into the hands of different factions. Coups d'état in the Middle East have rarely resulted in the leaders of the former regime being put out to pasture peacefully. The struggle is one for life and death and it is conceivable that one side may use nuclear weapons as a last-ditch option against its rival' This is pure conjecutre not based on any evidence or analogy - simply because this is a completely unknown situation for which we have no point of reference i.e. the unprecedented nuclear scenario. The point I'm trying to make is that we can't wait for the region to democratise before trying to negotiate Arms Control agreements. However, the danger from Iran is indeed real and perhaps the planners in the west are caluculating that a strike on that country's nuclear facilities will be a replay of what happened in 1945 when Japan was defeated: To smash the warlike hubris of a fanatic leadership leading in turn to concessions. 5. SB: 'Due to the experience in the region of military coups, most regimes will not be willing to relinquish central control and to delegate authority to the military units. In times of calm, this is no problem; in times of tension, it severely restricts the ability of the regime to develop doctrines of graduated response or to maintain escalation dominance' This argument is vague and the paragraph ambiguous and needs teasing out. On the face of it the author is suggesting that lack of military control is less stable than with civilian control. This appears to be contradictory to what has been said before.

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