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November 16, 2026

The treaties are gone. The weapons are not

November 16, 2026
6 mins read

I have been reading Annie Jacobsen’s Nuclear War: A Scenario this month. There’s a moment about a third of the way through when you realise that nobody in the story is going to do anything stupid. That is what makes it unbearable. The officers follow their procedures. The radar operators report what the radar shows. The president does what presidents have been told to do since Eisenhower. And at the end of seventy-two minutes most of the people on earth are dead or soon will be.

The plot, for what it is worth, runs like this. A missile goes up from North Korea at three minutes past three in the afternoon. The president is told a little over three minutes later. The interceptors, which have hit their target in just over half of their tests, miss. He has six minutes to decide. Just after half past three a one-megaton warhead goes off above the Pentagon, by which time American missiles are already climbing out of Wyoming towards Pyongyang. The shortest way there is over siberia, so moscow’s early-warning satellites, which are not very good, see an attack on russia and answer it. After that nothing anyone does makes much difference. Within a couple of years, the famine of the nuclear winter has killed, on the best estimate, five billion people, which is most of us.

It is a scenario, not a prophecy, and the tile of Jacobsen’s book says so. The point is the scenario, which she reconstructed from interviews with the people who ran it – a former defence secretary, a former head of Strategic Command, the physicist who designed the first hydrogen bomb – and scenario is real. Ronald Reagan, who had to live with it, put the matter in his memoirs better than anyone since. “Six minutes to decide how to respond to a blip on a radar scope and decide whether to unleash Armageddon! How could anyone apply reason at a time like that?” Nobody has found him a seventh minute.

What makes the book hard going in November 2026 is not the plot. It is the news on the table beside it. On the first Sunday of this month, a little after ten at night, phones across Kyiv lit up with official-looking warnings of a nuclear and chemical threat to the city. The next day the emergency app on the other side of the border told people in every russian region that nuclear warheads were on their way and that they should lay in three weeks of food. Both were hacks. In Ukraine people worked that out within the hour, and I suspect, the first few minutes were not spent laughing. For most of my adult life this was a historical subject. The weapons were still there, but they belonged to the past, like the bunkers under Whitehall, and the people who worried about them aloud were cranks. That has ended with the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

On 3 January 2022 the five recognised nuclear powers put out a joint statement declaring, in words borrowed from Reagan and Gorbachev, that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. Seven weeks later one of the signatories invaded its neighbour, and within three days its president was on television, flanked by his generals, putting his nuclear forces on alert. He has been reminding us ever since. “This is not a bluff,” vladimir putin said that September, announcing mobilisation. By the autumn, according to Bob Woodward, American intelligence put the odds of a tactical weapon being used in Ukraine at one in two if the Ukrainian army managed to trap thirty thousand invaders at Kherson. Lloyd Austin rang Sergei Shoigu to say that the United States would regard any such use as world changing. Shoigu replied that he did not take kindly to threats.

No weapon was used. It did not need to be. The threat alone kept the tanks, the F-16s and the long-range missiles on the far side of a line the West drew for itself and then redrew, year after year, each time discovering that the sky had not fallen. Meanwhile the threat was being made permanent. Tactical warheads went to belarus, or so moscow said. The nuclear doctrine was rewritten in November 2024 so that a conventional attack posing a “critical threat” to the state – no longer to its “very existence” – would be enough to justify a nuclear reply, and two days later a new intermediate-range missile, the Oreshnik, built to carry nuclear warheads, was fired at the Ukrainian city of Dnipro with inert warheads, by way of demonstration. It has been fired again since, most recently in May. It now has a base in belarus. And as I write, the war is going into its fifth winter and the latest round of talks in Abu Dhabi has produced a list of demands that begins with NATO pulling its troops out of central and eastern Europe.

None of this is lost on the rest of the world. Ukraine once had, on its soil, the third-largest nuclear arsenal on earth. It gave the warheads up in 1994 for written assurances that its borders would be respected, signed in Budapest by the same power that later crossed them. Governments that have looked at the bomb since have drawn the obvious conclusion. South Koreans discuss it in polite company. So, lately, do Poles and Germans.

This is the part of the news the book has made me read differently. The controls that once made the whole business slightly less terrifying have been coming off one by one. The treaty banning intermediate-range missiles died in 2019; the Oreshnik is what filled the gap. New START, the last agreement limiting the two big arsenals, expired on 5 February this year with nothing to replace it. For the first time in more than fifty years there is no ceiling, and there are no inspectors. moscow says it will keep to the old numbers for as long as Washington does; Washington has not said as much and wants China at any new table; China, which now has about 620 warheads and is building faster than anyone, declines to come. In May the review conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the bargain underneath everything else, ended without an agreed text for the third time running.

The bombs, meanwhile, multiply. Last October came the test of a cruise missile with a nuclear reactor for an engine and, a week later, of a nuclear-powered torpedo meant for ports and coastal cities. Within days President Trump announced that the United States would resume testing “on an equal basis”, and the kremlin told its officials to prepare a reply. No explosive test has happened – Washington later said it meant the delivery systems, not the warheads – but the moratorium, which has held since the last American shot in 1992, now rests on nothing more solid than the mood of a handful of men. And the wars keep coming. India and Pakistan, both nuclear-armed, fought for four days in May 2025. At the end of February, the United States and Israel went to war with Iran, whose enriched uranium the inspectors could no longer account for, and on the morning of 7 April the American president posted that “a whole civilization will die tonight” – and more than a fortnight passed before he said he had not meant a nuclear strike. The Doomsday Clock stood in January at eighty-five seconds to midnight, the closest in its seventy-nine years. People who set it are counting treaties and warheads, and both are heading the wrong way at once.

I am not arguing for disarmament, unilateral or otherwise. Britain is right to renew its deterrent, right to buy the F-35As that will give the RAF back the nuclear role it gave up in 1998 – even if the bombs will be American – and right to have agreed with France at Northwood, in July last year, to coordinate the two deterrents. Deterrence is the reason the blackmail over Ukraine has stayed blackmail. If the West has got anything wrong since 2022 it was not too much deterrence but too little faith in its own: it let the other side’s threats fix the limits of its help and taught every dictator with a reactor that the trick works.

What I am arguing for is something older and less fashionable: care. A country can afford to stand firm against a nuclear threat only if it has done everything it can to make sure that neither side stumbles into the real thing by mistake. Jacobsen’s book, read properly, is a manual for exactly that. Keep the lines open; the agreement, on the very day New START expired, to restore military contact between Washington and moscow after four years without a standing channel was worth more than most summits. Put the old ceilings back on paper and watch them from orbit if the inspectors cannot go back. Do not test; the moratorium is the one restraint a single explosion would end. Keep a human being – slow, frightened, capable of doubt – between the warning and the launch. The people of Kyiv did the same with their phones this month, and it took them half an hour. Give that human being more than six minutes.

I’m not at the end of the book yet, though I have looked. It closes twenty-four thousand years after the war, with whoever is left picking through a mound where a civilisation used to be, unable to read the warnings it left behind. The weapons are not going anywhere. The treaties that made them bearable have gone, and the habit of mind that made the treaties possible – the assumption that the other side would also rather not die – is going with them. Seventy-two minutes is shorter than a football match. It is all the time there would be to change our minds.

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